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It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV.
- Holmes, The Path of the Law
Rationality ex post facto - Whatever lives long is gradually so satu-
rated with reason that its irrational origins become improbable. Does
not every accurate history of the origin of something sound paradoxi-
cal and sacrilegious to our feelings? Doesn't the good historian contra-
dict all the time?
- Nietzsche, The Dawn
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, tremendous controversy has been generated over
the legal and ethical questions surrounding euthanasia, self-directed
death, physician assisted suicide, and the direct and active disemploy-
ment of artificial life-support.' At its core, this tangle of issues ulti-
* An earlier version of this Article was presented at the Kentucky State University
Institute for Liberal Studies' Conference on Science, Technology and Religious Ideas in the
Fall of 1990. The author would like to express his gratitude to Peter Lang Publishing for
permission to use selected excerpts from his book, THE CoNsTrrurIoNAL RiGHT TO SUICIDE:
A LEGAL AND PmaosoPmcAL EXAMINATION (1994).
** Assistant Professor, Saint Francis College, Loretto, Pennsylvania.; B.S.B.A., 1980, Xav-
ier University, Cincinnati, Ohio; J.D., 1985, University of Cincinnati; M.A., 1987, Univer-
sity of Cincinnati; Ph.D., 1989, University of Cincinnati.
1 See, e.g., James J. McCartney, The Right to Die: Perspectives from the Catholic and Jew-
ish Traditions, in To DIE OR Nor To DE? (Arthur S. Berger & Joyce Berger eds., 1990);
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mately implicates the more basic question of whether, and under what
circumstances, an individual may terminate his own existence.2
In the area of death and dying, the law has failed to keep pace with
medical technology.' Human life can now be extended to points where
rational, competent adults often conclude that it is no longer worth liv-
ing.4 Nevertheless, current law often severely restricts the individual's
right to exercise unfettered control over the circumstances of dying.5
The current dilemma is a result of a clash of ancient ideals. The
common law long recognized the individual's right to freedom from non-
consensual invasions of bodily integrity, 6 and this right has been ex-
tended to include the freedom to refuse necessary life-saving medical
EIKE-HENNER W. KLUGE, THE ETHIcs OF DELIBERATE DEATH (1981); Wayne Biddle &
Margot Slade, Ideas & Trends, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1984, at E7; Don Colburn, Euthenasia
[sic]; Allowing the Terminally Ill to Die is Generally Accepted. But Should "Active"
Euthenasia [sic] be Available in the United States?, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1988, at Z8;
Kevorkian is Charged Again With Aiding a Suicide, N.Y. TnKss, Nov. 30, 1993, at A18;
Louise Kiernan, Right-to-Die Issue Clouded by Kevorkian, CHI. TIUB., Nov. 28, 1993, at 1;
James J. Kilpatrick, When Should the Tubes be Pulled on Paralyzed or Brain-Dead Pa-
tients?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 22, 1993, at All; Philip J. O'Connor, A Doctor's Dying
Statement?; Did Physician Hope to Advance Assisted Suicide?, CHI. SuN-TIuds, Nov. 24,
1993, at 5; Paralyzed Woman's Eyes Tell Judge She Wants to Die, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB.,
Apr. 27, 1990, at A10.
2 John A. Powell, The Right to Die, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 169 (1994); Robert L. Risley,
Ethical and Legal Issues in the Individual's Right to Die, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 597 (1994);
Scott I. Davidson, Note, But Why Do We Shoot Horses?: An Analysis of the Right to Die and
Euthanasia, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hum. RTs. 115 (1994).
3 See Glenn W. Peterson, Comment, Balancing the Right to Die with Competing Interests:
A Socio-Legal Enigma, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 109, 155 (1985) ("[Wlhile medical science has
progressed by leaps and bounds... our courts and legislatures have mostly lagged behind
4 See Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia: Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of... Time," 53
U. Prrr. L. REv. 153, 155 (1991) (claiming that "new openness in thought" regarding eutha-
nasia is "motivated by a dread of medical technology that draws life out to harrowing
extremes").
5 See Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990) (holding that Missouri may require clear
and convincing evidence of incompetent's desire to remove life-sustaining support); In re
Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 608 (N.Y. 1988) (requiring showing of
clear and convincing evidence of patient's resolve to decline life-sustaining medical assist-
ance); Anne M. Guadin, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health: To Die or Not
to Die: That is the Question - But Who Decides?, 51 LA. L. REv. 1307, 1320-27 (1991).
6 The traditional intentional torts of battery and assault proscribe violations of an individ-
ual's dignitary interest in freedom from bodily harm and the fear of imminent bodily harm,
respectively. WIL iAM L. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 34-41 (4th ed. 1971). Unauthorized
medical treatment has been treated by the law as assault and battery. Physicians' and
Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 111 P.2d 568, 569 (Wash. 1941). Today, many states
require physicians to receive a patient's informed consent before proceeding with medical
treatment. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988), aff'd, 497 U.S. 261
(1990).
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treatment.7 Yet, the law has been equally anathematic to suicide.8 For
centuries, these doctrines peacefully co-existed. It is only with the explo-
sion of invasive medical technology that such tenets have come to battle
within the medical arena.
9
Approximately one-half of United States jurisdictions statutorily
prohibit assisted suicide,' ° punishing it as, among other classifications,
murder or manslaughter.'" Other states criminalize the causing, rather
than the assisting, of a suicide.' 2 Still others place no prohibitions on
suicide.13 Decisions to terminate life-support are easily swept under the
same broad rubric. Indeed, the accepted legal definitions of suicide in-
clude: "[s]elf-destruction; the deliberate termination of one's own life;"1 4
and "the deliberate and intentional destruction of [one's] own life by a
person of years of discretion and of sound mind.""5 Elections to suspend
life-support are also deliberate acts virtually certain to result in death.
In this arena, the prevention of suicide has even been identified by the
courts and commentators as an important state interest that may limit a
person's right to refuse life-saving medical treatment. 16 As a result, sit-
7 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119
(Mass. 1980); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984).
8 See Keith Burgess-Jackson, The Legal Status of Suicide in Early America: A Comparison
with the English Experience, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 57 (1982) (exploring varied development of
law governing suicide in colonial America); see also Newman, supra note 4, at 155 ("Part of
the reticence about euthanasia can be traced to the social opprobrium that attaches to
suicide.").
9 A number of the recent "right to die" cases address this conflict directly, balancing the
common right of bodily integrity against a state's interest in preventing suicide. In re Con-
roy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989).
10 See H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Michele Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A
Critique of Legal Sanctions, 36 Sw. L.J. 1003, 1019 (1982); Thomas J. Marzen et al., Sui-
cide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 97 (1985); Catherine D. Shaffer, Note,
Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 CoLuM. L. REV. 348, 350-54 (1986).
11 Shaffer, supra note 10, at 353.
12 Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 98; Shaffer, supra note 10, at 353. But see WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 649 (1986).
13 Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 98.
14 BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
15 WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2286 (1981).
16 Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980); Commissioner of Correction v. Meyers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Mass. 1979); Su-
perintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-27 (Mass. 1977);
Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 339; Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223; PRESIDENT'S COMNIsSSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, 32 (1983); Carol A. Colabrese, Com-
ment, In re Storar: The Right to Die and Incompetent Patients, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1087,
1092 (1982). However, in its seminal Saikewicz decision, the court minimizes the influence
of this state interest in many right to die cases:
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uations have developed in which seriously ill competent adults have
found it nearly impossible to compel the removal of invasive life-support
systems. 17 Thus, many rational and humane decisions to deliberately
facilitate death are treated as suicide by the patient, and assisted suicide
or even murder by the administering agent.'
As a reaction to this expanding problem, a number of legal schol-
ars19 and courts 20 have addressed the notion of a constitutional right to
suicide which would protect the individual's right to terminate his own
existence in certain circumstances. This Article undertakes a detailed
examination of a critical, yet virtually unexplored, area of that debate.
Historical analysis of the legal proscription of self-destruction reveals
that the origins of this taboo lie in theological dogma. This Article en-
deavors to show that the rationale behind the age-old proscription of self-
willed death will not survive modern-day constitutional scrutiny. In so
doing, it will demonstrate the pervasive influence of religious ideologies
on the legal interdiction of suicide, and suggest that modern legal
thought need not be bound by the traditional eschatologies of these ideol-
The interest in protecting against suicide seems to require little if any dis-
cussion. In the case of the competent adult's refusing medical treatment such
an act does not necessarily constitute suicide since (1) in refusing treatment
the patient may not have the specific intent to die, and (2) even if he did, to the
extent that the cause of death was from natural causes the patient did not set
the death producing agent in motion with the intent of causing his own death
.... Furthermore, the underlying State interest in this area lies in the preven-
tion of irrational self-destruction. What we consider here is a competent, ra-
tional decision to refuse treatment when death is inevitable and the treatment
offers no hope of cure or preservation of life.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11 (citations omitted).
17 See generally Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), reh'g denied (June 5, 1986); In re
Rodas, No. 86PR139 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Apr. 3, 1987); Satz, 362 So. 2d 160; In re Lydia E. Hall
Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); State
v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
18 See GLANviLLE WuLkms, THE SANCTrrY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 318 (1957). In
particular, see People v. Kevorkian, No. 90-3909637-AZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. Feb. 5, 1991), re-
printed in 7 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 107 (1991).
19 Alan Sullivan, A Constitutional Right to Suicide, in SuicmE: TaE PHLOsoPmcAL IssUEs
229 (M. Pabst Battin & David J. Mayo, eds., 1980); Engelhardt, Jr. & Malloy, supra note
10, at 1013-20; G. Steven Neeley, Patient Autonomy and State Intervention: Reexamining
the State's Purported Interest, 19 N. Ky. L. REv. 235, 238-40 (1992); David A.J. Richards,
Constitutional Privacy, the Right to Die and the Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 327, 403-407 (1981). Contra Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 147; James
Bopp, Jr., Is Assisted Suicide Constitutionally Protected?, 3 IssuEs L. & MED. 113, 129
(1987).
20 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976) (applying constitutional right to privacy, articulated in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959
(1973), to terminally ill patient's right to refuse treatment).
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ogies. Now that medical technology can extend human existence beyond
the point where the rational person might well choose to die, universal
proscriptions of suicide based only on blind imitation of the past must be
reexamined.
I. PRE-CHRISTIAN THOUGHT
Suicide was widely practiced among ancient peoples. Among Aryan
immigrants into the Punjab, it was commonplace for widows to commit
suicide in order to avoid dependence on relatives.2 1 Hindu widows fre-
quently sacrificed themselves as part of the funeral rites of their hus-
bands.2 2 Under the influence of Brahmanism, persons who believed that
their sins had doomed them to many more transmigrations of the soul
and were dissatisfied with life would commit suicide in the hope of im-
proving it through reincarnation.2 3 In China and Japan, suicide was rec-
ognized as an honorable alternative to disgraceful existence. 24 The an-
cient Norse were known to bring on death rather than die by natural
infirmity and be deprived of a seat in Valhalla.25 Also, despite the al-
leged religious commandment against self-slaughter, there are a number
of suicides recorded by the ancient Hebrews. 26
The ancient West generally viewed suicide as a matter of grave im-
port, but nevertheless a matter of personal decision which was quite
often appropriate in grievous circumstances. Thus, although the laws of
ancient Thebes and Athens expressed a general disinclination towards
self-destruction, the philosophical community often accepted suicide as
noble.2 7 Plato reports Socrates' belief that man is the property of the
gods 28 and that self-imposed death would bring divine vengeance, but
that the gods' permission could be found in situations such as the sen-
tence imposed upon Socrates himself.2 9 In fact, Plato admitted a
number of exceptions to the prohibition of suicide-"shame of extreme
21 JAMES J. ODEA, SUICIDE 5 (1882).
22 Id. at 5-6.
23 Id. at 17.
24 Id. at 25-26.
25 Id. at 57.
26 George Rosen, History, in A HANDBOOK FOR THE SrUDY OF SUCIDE 3, 4-5 (Seymour Per-
lin, M.D. ed., 1975). Also, the Old Testament includes accounts of assisted suicide, such as
that of the Amalekite who killed Saul on Saul's request. 2 Samuel 1:5-10.
27 See ARTHUR J. DROGE & JAMES D. TABOR, A NOBLE DEATH: SUICIDE AND MARTYRDOM
AMONG CHRmsTINSANND JEws IN ANTIQUrrY 17-20 (1992).
28 Plato, Phaedo, in FrvE GREAT DIALOGUEs 90 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Walter J. Black
1942).
29 Id. at 90-91. Socrates argued that the rule that "things which are evil may be good at
certain times and to certain persons" applies to death and suicide. Id. at 90. The true phi-
losopher, after all, in rejecting bodily pleasures and seeking spiritual fulfillment in life,
essentially seeks the ultimate separation of body from soul, which is death. The philoso-
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distress and poverty" or "extraordinary sorrow"-and actually defined
the term in such a way as to severely curtail the effectiveness of the gen-
eral proscription. 30 Thus, a suicide is one: (1) who uses violence to take
his fate out of the hands of destiny; (2) who is not acting in obedience to
any legal decision of his state; (3) whose hand is not forced by the pres-
sure of some excruciating and unavoidable misfortune; (4) who has not
fallen into some irremediable disgrace that he cannot live with, and (5)
who imposes this unjust judgment on himself in a spirit of slothful and
abject cowardice.3 1
Aristotle, to the contrary, occupies a minority position among the
ancients, refusing to admit of any exceptions to the prohibition of suicide.
He argues that "the law does not expressly permit suicide, and what it
does not expressly permit it forbids,"3 2 even though the injustice is "to-
wards the state, not towards [the felo de se] himself. "3 3 "This is also the
reason why the state punishes; a certain loss of civil rights attaches to
the man who destroys himself, on the ground that he is treating the state
unjustly."34
The Stoic and Epicurean philosophers devoted much more attention
to suicide than did their predecessors. The Epicureans were occupied
chiefly with the sensitive and emotional side of human nature, and
equated happiness with freedom from pain.35 Epicurus labored strenu-
ously to eradicate the fear of death,3 6 which he considered the bugbear of
humanity and a nemesis to happiness. 37 "Death is nothing to us," he
writes, "for what has been dissolved has no sensation, and what has no
sensation is nothing to us."3s The sagacious Epicurean surrounds him-
pher, then lives his life in constant search of death; in fact, he wills his own death. Id. at 92-
98.
30 WnLLAMs, supra note 18, at 251-52 (describing how Plato's condemnation of suicide was
largely destroyed by his admitting exceptions "of the most elastic character").
31 PLATO, THE LAws 391 (Trevor J. Saunders trans., 1970).
32 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION TO AIsTOTLE, 300, 421-22 (Richard
McKeon ed., 1947).
33 Id. at 422.
34 Id.
35 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, in LErTRs, PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES, AND VATICAN SAYINGS
55-56 (Russel M. Geer trans., 1964) ( [H]ealth of body and (peace of mind).., is the final
end of the blessed life. For to gain this end, namely freedom from pain and fear, we do
everything.").
36 Id. at 54 ("Accustom yourself to the belief that death is of no concern to us, since all good
and all evil lie in sensation and sensation ends with death.").
37 Id. "[Tihe true belief that death is nothing to us makes a mortal life happy, not by ad-
ding to it an infinite time, but by taking away the desire for immortality .... [H]e is foolish
who says he fears death, not because it will be painful when it comes, but because the
anticipation of it is painful." Id.
38 Epicurus, Principle Doctrines, in LETTERS, PRINCIPLE DOCTRINES, AND VATICAN SAYINGS
60 (Russel M. Geer trans., 1964).
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self with all possible safeguards against the calamities of life. Failing to
achieve happiness in this way, he is at liberty to retire from life itself.39
Such a man could take this ultimate step free from a fear of divine wrath
or of societal mores, for his devotion to reason has made him the master
of his fate.4" Indeed, the wise man "thinks it better to meet misfortune
while acting with reason than to happen upon good fortune while acting
senselessly; for it is better that what has been well-planned in our ac-
tions (should fail than that what has been ill-planned) should gain suc-
cess by chance." 41 Suicide is a matter of private judgment for each per-
son. Individuals deliberating suicide should remember that even though
nature has furnished only one door into life, it has furnished many ways
out.42 Such an understanding liberates humankind from the dread of
enduring a miserable life.43 Understanding that death means nothing
more than the cessation of sensation is liberating. "There is no reason
why the man who is thoroughly assured that there is nothing to fear in
death should find anything to fear in life."" As Cicero's advocate of Epi-
cureanism observes,
a strong and lofty spirit is entirely free from anxiety and sorrow. It
makes light of death, for the dead are only as they were before they
were born. It is schooled to encounter pain by recollecting that pains
of great severity are ended by death, and slight ones have frequent
intervals of respite; while those of medium intensity lie within our
own control: we can bear them if they are endurable, or if they are not,
we may serenely quit life's theatre, when the play has ceased to please
US.
4 5
The Stoics were oftentimes even more adamant than the Epicureans
in their belief that we should live only by our own decree. Reason was
regarded by the Stoics as the ultimate arbiter of such decisions, and is
even referred to as the God in man.46 The Stoics also advocated accept-
ance of life's vicissitudes, and regarded death as a friend which opens to
every soul an escape from the bondage of the body and the evils of this
39 See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
40 Letter to Menoeceus, supra note 35, at 54 ("[Wlhile we exist death is not present, and
when death is present we no longer exist. [Death] is therefore nothing either to the living or
the dead .... "). "[Tihe pleasant life.., is produced by the reason which is sober.. . ." Id. at
57.
41 Id. at 58-59.
42 2 SENECA, AD LucILruM EpisTuLAE MORALES 65 (Richard M. Gummere trans., 1967)
("The best thing which eternal law ever ordained was that it allowed to us one entrance
into life, but many exits.").
43 Letter to Menoeceus, supra note 35, at 54.
44Id.
45 CICERO, DE FINmus BONORUM ET MALORUM 53 (H. Rackham, trans., 2d ed. 1961).
46 2 SENECA, supra note 42, at 465 ("Reason... is a common attribute of both gods and
men; in the gods it is already perfected, in us it is capable of being perfected.").
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world.47 Death merely reduces the body to its primitive elements, and
either annihilates the soul or ushers it into regions of rest.48 The union
of body and soul was effected to equip the soul with the necessary means
for its fulfillment.49 Should any obstacle prevent the soul from such ful-
fillment, then suicide is not only reasonable, it is a noble expression of
human freedom.50 Thus, Seneca exhorts, "'[ i t is wrong to live under
constraint; but no man is constrained to live under constraint.'... On all
sides lie many short and simple paths to freedom; and let us thank God
that no man can be kept in life."51
While the Epicureans viewed suicide as a reasonable alternative to
an unfortunate life, the Stoics went even further, arguing that an indi-
vidual might commit suicide even though not presently dissatisfied with
his lot in life.52 Cicero reports that for the Stoic, very often it is appropri-
ate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying
supreme happiness if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit, for
the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with na-
ture, is a matter of seizing the right moment.5 3 The general rule, how-
ever, is that "[wihen a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of
things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain
alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary
things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life."54
Among all of the Stoics, Seneca was preeminent as an advocate of
suicide.55 His calm, rational approach to the matter exemplifies the very
paradigm of the Stoic position on the subject.5 6 Seneca's view is largely
based on common sense.5 7 He is quick to press the point that it is not the
quantity of life which should be of paramount concern, but rather the
47 See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
48 2 SENECA, supra note 42, at 83 ("[Tlhe soul at death is either sent forth into a better life,
destined to dwell with deity amid greater radiance and calm, or else, at least, without suf-
fering any harm to itself, it will be mingled with nature again, and will return to the
universe.").
49 1 id. at 453-57.
50 1 id. at 457 ("Never shall I lie in order to honour this petty body. When it seems proper, I
shall sever my connexion with it .... To despise our bodies is sure freedom.").
51 1 id. at 71-73.
52 CICERO, supra note 45, at 277-281.
53 Id. at 281.
54 Id. at 279.
55 2 SENECA, supra note 42, at 57-73.
56 2 id. at 63. "If one death is accompanied by torture, and the other is simple and easy,
why not snatch the latter? Just as I shall select my ship when I am about to go on voyage,
or my house when I propose to take a residence, so I shall choose my death when I am
about to depart from life." 2 id.
57 2 id. "The best form of death is the one we like." 2 id.
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quality, and when that quality is gone one's living is done.5" Seneca
views the act of suicide as a rational means of depriving fate of its
sting.5 9 When misfortune has robbed this life of all hope and promise, it
is better to take matters into our own hands rather than suffer at the
whims of fate.6 0 Seneca entreats us, "Wive, if you so desire; if not, you
may return to the place whence you came."6 ' He continues, "[i]f you
would pierce your heart, a gaping wound is not necessary; a lancet will
open the way to that great freedom, and tranquility can be purchased at
the cost of a pin-prick."6 2 The man who thus consorts to control his own
destiny is far from seeking the coward's way out, but rather by wrestling
control of his life from the hands of fortune, he has earned entitlement to
be counted as a noble soul.6" But the life of reason advocated by Seneca
is not a life of unadulterated egoism. 64 In particular, the decision to ter-
minate one's own existence should be accompanied by external consider-
ations of an ethical nature, and Seneca balances his rationalistic support
of suicide with an altruistic concern for the welfare of others.
65
58 2 SENECA, supra note 42, at 57-59. "For mere living is not a good, but living well. Accord-
ingly, the wise man will live as long as he ought, not as long as he can." 2 id. at 59. Indeed,
"[i]t is not a question of dying earlier or later, but of dying well or ill. And dying well means
except from danger of living ill." 2 id. "He always reflects concerning the quality, and not
the quantity, of his life. As soon as there are many events in his life that give him trouble
and disturb his piece of mind, he sets himself free." 2 id.
59 2 SENECA, supra note 42, at 65. "Must I await the cruelty either of disease or of man,
when I can depart through the midst of torture, and shake off my troubles?" 2 id. "It is
reason which teaches us that fate has various ways of approach, but the same end, and that
it makes no difference at which point the inevitable event begins." 2 id. at 71.
60 2 SENECA, supra note 42, at 59. Seneca urges, "[sihall I reflect that Fortune has all
power over one who lives, rather than reflect that she has no power over one who knows
how to die?" 2 id. In this sense, "[t]he best thing which eternal law ever ordained was that
it allowed to us one entrance into life, but many exits." 2 id. at 65.
61 2 id.
62 2 id.
63 2 SENECA, supra note 42, at 71-73. "He is truly great who not only has given himself the
order to die, but has also found the means." 2 id. at 71.
64 3 id. at 191-211. Seneca instructs that although at times it's easier to go than to stay,
one must stay for the sake of those around him. 3 id. at 191.
65 3 SENECA, supra note 42, at 191.
For one must indulge genuine emotions; sometimes, even in spite of weighty
reasons, the breath of life must be called back and kept at our very lips even at
the price of great suffering, for the sake of those whom we hold dear; because
the good man should not live as long as it pleases him, but as long as he ought.
He who does not value his wife, or his friend, highly enough to linger longer in
life-he who obstinately persists in dying-is a voluptuary.
3 id. at 191-93.
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The later Stoics continued to look upon reason as the supreme guide
of human action, and favored suicide as a suitable and rational alterna-
tive to a life devoid of pleasure.6" Thus, Epictetus reminds us,
the door is open. Do not be a greater coward than the children, but do
as they do. Children, when things do not please them, say, "I will not
play any more;" so, when things seem to you to reach that point, just
say, "I will not play anymore," and so depart, instead of staying to
make moan.
6 7
Similarly, Marcus Aurelius instructs us to keep the temporal fate of
humankind always in sight: "Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a
skeleton.... Why then dost thou not wait in tranquility for thy end,
whether it is extinction or removal to another state?"6" But, if we are
thwarted in the attempt to achieve happiness or some other goal in life
because some insuperable object is in the way,
[d]o not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being done depends not
on thee.-But it is not worth while to live, if this cannot be done.-
Take thy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is
in full activity, and well pleased too with the things which are
obstacles.
69
Partly as a result of the dominant philosophical perspective of the
time, suicide was a frequent occurrence under the first Roman emper-
ors.70 During the reign of the Caesars, persons under threat of prosecu-
tion for treason would commit suicide in order to escape conviction, for-
feiture of their property to the state, and denial of customary burial.
71
"Notwithstanding these practices, Roman law never came to include any
general prohibition of suicide."7 2 However, in the particular case of
those who entertained suicide as a means to ensure the proprietary
rights of their heirs, it was later ordained that the estate of criminals
would nevertheless be forfeited: "Persons who have been accused, or
have been caught while committing a crime, and, through fear of im-
pending accusation, kill themselves, have no heirs."73 However, in order
to avoid injustice, the prospective heirs were permitted to challenge the
guilt of the deceased.7 4 If the innocence of the accused could be estab-
66 See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
67 Epictetus, The Discourses of Epictetus, in THE STOIC AND EPicuREAN PHaOsoPHERS 224,
266 (P.E. Matheson trans., 1940).
68 Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, in THE SToIC AND Epi-
cuiEAN PHILosoplERs 491, 524 (G. Long trans., 1940).
69 Id. at 550.
70 WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 253.
71 Id. at 254.
72 Id.
73 11 THi CIviL LAw 129 (S.P. Scott trans., 1932).
74 WiLLAMS, supra note 18, at 254.
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lished, the heirs were entitled to his effects.7" "Thus there was no gen-
eral forfeiture of property for suicide."7" Furthermore, it was clear that
the Roman condemnation was not of suicide per se:
[W]here persons who have not yet been accused of crime, lay violent
hands on themselves, their property shall not be confiscated by the
Treasury; for it is not the wickedness of the deed that renders it pun-
ishable, but it is held that the consciousness of guilt entertained by
the defendant is considered to take the place of a confession.
77
II. THE INFLUX OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
There is nothing in the Old Testament which can clearly be under-
stood as offering explicit judgment on the ancient Judaic view of sui-
cide.78 Indeed, it contains no expression equivalent to the English term
"suicide" as a distinct cause of death. 79 The earliest known prohibition of
self-killing among the Jews occurred in the first century A.D. when
Josephus forbad his soldiers from sacrificing themselves in order to avoid
surrender to the Romans." ° On this occasion, in an address to his troops,
Josephus advanced the view that self-killing was a cowardly act contrary
to nature and the law of God, who committed man's soul to his body.s"
As such,
the souls of those whose hands have acted madly against themselves,
a region of darker Hades receives; and God, their father, visits on the
offspring the impiety of their parents. Hence this deed is hateful to
God, and is punished by the wisest of lawgivers. This it is ordained
among us, that those who destroy themselves shall be exposed unbur-
ied till sunset.8
2
There is no offering in the New Testament to suggest a condemna-
tion of suicide.8 3 The dominant Christian belief was that temporal exist-
ence "was important only as a preparation for the hereafter."8 4 The
supreme duty in this life was to avoid the sin which would result in eter-
nal damnation.8
5
75 11 THE CrViL LAW, supra note 73, at 130.
76 WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 254.
77 11 THE CrViL LAW, supra note 73, at 129.
78 Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 17 (citing NoRMAN ST. JoHN-STEvAS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE
LAW 58 (1964)).
79 Id. at 18 (citing Daube, The Linguistics of Suicide, 1 PH.. AND PUB. AFF., 387-437
(1972)).
80 See FLAviUs JosEpHus, THm JEWISH WAR 199 (G.A. Williamson trans., 1960).
81 Id. at 199-203.
82 FAVIUS JOSEpHUS, THE JEWISH WAR 35 (Rev. Robert Traill trans., Houlston and
Stoneman 1851).
83 WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 254.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 254-55.
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Since all natural desires tended towards sin, the risk of failure was
great. Many Christians, therefore, committed suicide for fear of fall-
ing before temptation. It was especially good if the believer could com-
mit suicide by provoking infidels to martyr him, or by austerities so
severe that they undermined the constitution, but in the last resort he
might do away with himself directly.8 6
It became commonplace for fanatical Christians to taunt their Roman
persecutors into acts of violence.8 7 The sect whom Saint Augustine
noted in particular for this practice was the Circumcelliones:
[Tlhese people not only sought out martyrdom, profaning the temples
of paganism in order to be executed, but, when all other expedients
failed, cast themselves by the hundreds in ecstasy from lofty cliffs "till
the rocks below were reddened with their blood." "To kill themselves,"
said Augustine, "out of respect for martyrdom is their daily sport."
88
Undoubtedly, these religious excesses led Augustine to condemn suicide
in forthright terms and to become "the chief architect of the later Chris-
tian view."8 9 Augustine's main argument is that suicide is forbidden by
the sixth commandment's admonition against killing:
Not for nothing is it that in the holy canonical books no divinely in-
spired order or permission can be found authorizing us to inflict death
upon ourselves, neither in order to acquire immortality nor in order to
avert or divert some evil. For we must certainly understand the com-
mandment as forbidding this when it says: "Thou shalt not kill," par-
ticularly since it does not add "thy neighbour," as it does when it for-
bids false witnessing.
90
86 Id, at 255.
87 O'DEA, supra note 21, at 67-77.
88 WILiAMs, supra note 18, at 255.
89 Id.
The true reason for Augustine's stand against suicide appears plainly enough
from the historical events of his age. These indicated that a prohibition of sui-
cide was a necessary corollary of the church's other teaching, which would,
without this corollary, have operated, and did in fact operate, as an incitement
to suicide. If death means annihilation, there can be no point in suicide except
as an escape from suffering. But if man's life on earth is merely a period of
waiting for a divine glory to be revealed, the true believer is naturally subject
to the temptation to accelerate his eternal bliss, unless a new religious rule is
devised to forbid it. Augustine himself pointed this out when he said that if
suicide were permissible to avoid sin, then suicide would become the logical
course for all those who were fresh from baptism. It is not surprising that Au-
gustine recoiled from this result, but he could deny it, within the framework of
his own beliefs, only by postulating a divine prohibition of suicide.
Id. at 256-57.
90 1 SAINT AuGusTnm, THx CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS 91 (George E. McCracken
trans., T.E. Page et al. eds., Harvard University Press 1966) (1957).
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Furthermore, although the ancient philosophers generally held that sui-
cide often can be a laudable and noble act,91 Augustine equated it with
an act of cowardice.92 No matter what hardship or calamity befell an
individual, Augustine's interpretation of the holy edict was unwaver-
ing:93 suicide is never permissible.94 Those misguided souls who defied
God's will and took their destinies into their own hands were met with a
fate far worse than anything imaginable upon earth.95
Augustine's views on suicide eventually found expression in Church
law.96
The first Christian prohibition of suicide is sometimes attributed to
the Council of Arles, A.D. 452. In fact, however, this measure was
directed only against the suicide of servants (famuli). 'Not the act, but
dislike of its repercussions as they affect the master and landowner,
provides the motive which makes the act criminal in certain cases and
envisages the suicide as diabolicus repletus furore.' The earliest disap-
proval was expressed by the second Council of Orleans, A.D. 533,
which allowed churches to receive the oblations (offerings) even of
those who were killed in the commission of a crime, provided that they
did not lay violent hands on themselves.
9 7
In 563 A.D., the Council of Braga denied full burial rights to suicides,
and the Capitula of Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, stated that
mass could not be said for suicides, although prayers and alms could be
offered. 98 The Synod of Auxerre, in 578 A.D., specifically announced that
"no offering should be received from one who had taken his own life."99
The Council of Toledo, in 693 A.D., punished attempted suicide with ex-
clusion from Church membership for two months.100 "The Synod of
91 See supra notes 27-29, 35-67 and accompanying text.
92 See 1 AUGUSTINE, supra note 90, at 97-99. St. Augustine argues that those who commit
suicide do so because of lack of strength and weakness of mind. 1 id.
93 1 id.
94 1 id. at 117 (voicing argument that suicide is not even permitted in order to avoid com-
mission of sin). "For if there could be any legitimate reason for committing suicide, there
could be none more legitimate than this, I am sure. But since not even this one is legiti-
mate, therefore there is none such." 1 id.
95 1 AUGUSTINE, supra note 90, at 113. "[N]o man ought to inflict on himself a voluntary
death, thinking to escape temporary ills, lest he find himself among ills that are unending
... as the better life after death does not accept those who are guilty of their own death." 1
id.
96 See NomaAN ST. JoHN-STEvAs, Lws, DEATH AND THE LAW, 249 (1961) (citing to 5 AUGUST
NEANDER, GENERAL HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND CHURCH 141 (Joseph Torrey
trans., Crocker & Brewster 1865)).
97 WILLLIAMS, supra note 18, at 257 (citations omitted).
98 ST. JoHN-STEvAs, supra note 96, at 249.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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Nimes, 1284, refused suicides even the right of quiet interment in holy
ground."1 0 '
Saint Thomas Aquinas unerringly followed the theological and phil-
osophical parameters established by Augustine in his continued elabora-
tion of Church teaching on suicide.' 0 2 Integrating faith with reason in
an effort to support a predetermined theological doctrine, Aquinas ar-
gued that suicide is always intrinsically wrong:
It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First, be-
cause everything naturally loves itself, the result being that every-
thing naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corruption so far as it
can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature, and to
charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence suicide is al-
ways a mortal sin, as being contrary to the natural law and to charity.
Secondly, because every part, as such, belongs to the whole. Now
every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he belongs to the
community. Hence by killing himself he injures the community, as
the Philosopher declares.
Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to His power,
Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life, sins
against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins against that
slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter
not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sen-
tence of death and life, according to Deut. xxxii. 39, I will kill and I
will make to live.
1 0 3
The influence of scholasticism stifled free-thinking discussions of su-
icide throughout the Middle Ages and cast a shadow of religious intoler-
ance over the subject which continues today.'0 4 The scholastics erected
an unwavering proscription of self-willed death which was supported by
appeal to Divine authority.'0 5 Saint Thomas Aquinas, the preeminent
philosopher of the Church,'0° stated the matter succinctly: suicide is al-
101 WI.LiAMs, supra note 18, at 258.
102 See infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.
103 2 THoMAs AQuiNAs, SuMmA THEOLOGICA, 1468-69 (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., Benzinger Bros. 1947) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
104 See EARL A. GROLLMAN, SUICIDE 22-29 (1971).
105 Id.
106 The philosophy of Aquinas "occupies a favoured position in the intellectual life of the
Catholic Church." FREDERICK CoPLEsTON, AQUINAs 235 (Penguin Books 1955). This is due
in part to the encylical letter of Pope Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris in 1879, which "asserted the
permanent value of the Thomist synthesis and urged Catholic philosophers to draw their
inspiration from Aquinas, while developing Thomism to meet modern intellectual needs."
Id. at 238. See also GROLLMAN, supra note 104, at 24. The theories of Aquinas hinged on his
perception that "all life was a preparation for the eternal." Id. His opposition to suicide was
based upon an absolute reverence for human life and submission to the will of God. Id.
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ways a mortal sin.1" 7 By further asserting that heaven does not accept
the soul of one who commits suicide,'0 8 medieval philosophers enveloped
the concept of self-imposed death within a web of superstition and fear.
Suicide was thought to be an abominable and unnatural crime which de-
prived God of His sole authority over life and death."0 9 The felo de se
was deprived of the possibility of repentance, and so necessarily died
with a grievous sin on his conscience."10 As an act mala in se, it was
certain to result in damnation.'
Although it would perhaps be unfair to demand a thoroughgoing
conceptual analysis of the issue by thinkers who antedated such a move-
ment, it would nevertheless seem that the Church patriarchs might have
examined the question with greater care. A more complete analysis of
the subject-even within the rigid theological parameters of the medie-
val consciousness-might have yielded quite a different result.
Augustine's contempt for suicide stems from his conclusion that the
sixth commandment applies to self-killing." 2 Augustine limits the over-
breadth of the holy canon by stating that it does not prohibit the killing
of plants and animals, 13 but he asserts that it does encompass self-im-
posed death "for in fact he who kills himself kills what is no other than a
man."" 4 Augustine allows for a number of exceptions to the rule as ap-
plied to homicide, but is loathe to sanction any exceptions for suicide."15
Thus, one man may kill another in times of war, capital punishment, or
out of obedience to God, while suicide is permissible only when ordered
by the Creator and the "divine command is not made precarious by any
doubt.""1
6
107 See 2 AQUINAS, supra note 103, at 1468-70.
108 See 1 AUGUSTINE, supra note 90, at 91-95.
[H]ow on earth does anyone say to a human being, "Do away with yourself so as
not to add to your petty sins one more serious, living as you do in slavery to a
shameless master who has the manners of a savage," when he cannot say with-
out utter wickedness, "Do away with yourself now that all your sins have been
washed away, lest you commit the like again or even worse, living, as you do, in
a world so alluring with its unclean pleasures, so insane with its abominable
cruelties, so hostile with its errors and its terrors"?
1 id. at 117 (citations omitted).
109 WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 264.
110 Id. at 255-56.
111 Id. at 255.
112 Id. at 255-56.
113 1 AUGUSTINE, supra note 90, at 95-97.
114 Id. Augustine sets forth the stringent exceptions to the sixth commandment, all of
which require the authority of God's command. Id.
"5 Wams, supra note 18, at 255, 321-323 (describing suicide as detestable and a dam-
nable wickedness but admitting some euthanasia is "justified by necessity").
116 1 AUGUSTINE, supra note 90, at 113. See also GROLLMAN, supra note 104, at 23 (stating
Augustine did not condone self-imposed death). Ironically, Augustine's philosophies come
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But is the sixth commandment truly this inflexible? Are there no
other exceptions to the Divine condemnation of suicide? Does God al-
ways intend us to prolong life to its last bitter breath? Suicide may not
be the most rational or morally responsible course of action for those
whose lives hold some realistic glimmer of hope or promise and it is un-
derstood that zealots should be restrained from ending their lives in a
moment of religious ecstasy in the hope of obtaining everlasting bliss.
But there are always some for whom life has become an intolerable and
irremediable burden. Under the traditional view entertained by the pa-
tristics, God granted us stewardship over our lives, and through utiliza-
tion of free will and intellect we are expected to manage our affairs
wisely. It would seem to be in accordance with the dictates of reason and
the will of a merciful God to summon death when life's value has been
spent. When reason shows that life has no more to offer, it is folly to
perpetuate an unrewarding existence. If I may lay down my life in de-
fense of others, why not surrender my life in order to spare myself fur-
ther agony? Again, if God allows us to take human life in instances of
self-defense, why should I be prohibited from exiting life when my exist-
ence per se has become my own greatest nemesis?
The advocate of scholasticism might reply that human suffering
serves a greater purpose, such as atonement for the transgressions of
God's law, and that we are never justified in circumventing such punish-
ment. It is arguable that God mercifully allows us to suffer in this life so
that torment might be avoided in the world to come. Lofty conceptions of
ascetic virtue might compel the religious mind to welcome whatever
frowns of fortune God sees fit to visit, and many individuals may wish to
prolong their existence as long as possible in order to affect their peculiar
understanding of God's will. But it is questionable whether such reli-
gious heroism ought to become the standard for all to bear.
Aquinas augments the Augustinian position by declaring that sui-
cide is unnatural, violative of the rights of the community, and deroga-
tive of God's sole authority over life and death.117 Yet even this buttress
is not sufficient to make the orthodox position unassailable. Aquinas is
quite correct to assert that animate life seeks to preserve itself and so
resists hostile forces. 1 ' But it does not follow from this observation that
suicide is necessarily unnatural. Aquinas ignores the attendant observa-
tion that sentient beings also resist hostile forces in order to avoid pain.
Circumstances arise in which death becomes the only certain means of
to a head when theorizing whether suicide may be utilized "in the case of a woman whose
honor was in danger." 1 id. Ultimately the sixth commandment prevails in this instance,
since God does not afford such a woman the option of taking her own life. 1 AUGUSTNE,
supra note 90, at 115.
117 3 WALTER FARPRELL, A COMPANION TO THE SUMMA, 198, 198-99 (1952).
118 3 id.
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quelling physical and psychic torment. In light of such occurrences, it
becomes difficult to argue that the decision to exit life by one's own hand
is unnatural in any real sense.
Aquinas invokes an Aristotelian notion in order to assert that sui-
cide violates the rights of the community. The argument proposes: every
part belongs to the whole in virtue of what it is; every man is part of a
community, and so must belong to the community. As such, suicide dam-
ages the community. 119 It is difficult to understand what Aquinas really
had in mind by invoking this syllogistic rationale. The Aristotelian pre-
cursor to which Aquinas refers seems aimed at protecting the rights of
the civil community from the harm incurred through the loss of one of its
constituents. Yet any argument that seeks to prohibit individual suicide
for the sake of the community at large is tantamount to a stark form of
utilitarianism which would subjugate the rights of the individual to the
purported good of the masses. Members of a community do not belong to
the community in the same sense that parts belong to a machine. The
spokes of a wheel may have no purpose apart from the wheel. But do we
want to make the same claim about persons, that the individual has pur-
pose and meaning only insofar as she is a constituent of a larger whole?
Arguments which assert that individual rights are always subordinate to
the welfare of the state run roughshod over the sanctity of personal lib-
erty and are accordingly antithetical to the most basic tenets of Anglo-
American jurisprudence.
Aquinas' final argument asserts that because life is a "gift" from
God, we are subject to His sole authority concerning life and death.12 0
Not only does this metaphor fail to do justice to the complexity of the
actual issue of man's existence in relation to God, but Aquinas fails to
follow through on all of the attendant ramifications. A true gift can be
refused; only sentences are mandatory. Even once accepted, no gift is
expected to be retained indefinitely at the expense and harm of the recip-
ient. When its possession becomes more injurious that its surrender, it
would be a prudent use of God's gift to relinquish it. To suppose that
suicide defrauds God of His supreme right over creation betrays a rather
naive concept of both God and creation.
119 See 2 AQUINAS, supra note 103, at 1469. See Joseph Fletcher, In Defense of Suicide, in
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 38, 43 (Samuel E. Wallace & Albin Eser eds., 1981) (Christian
moralists also felt that "human life is a divine monopoly," and therefore to take from this
monopoly is to take what is God's). But see Mary Margaret Penrose, Comment, Assisted
Suicide: A Tough Pill To Swallow, 20 PFPP. L. REv. 689, 693-94 (1993) (pointing out that
many ancient cultures viewed suicide as "a dignified act of heroism").
120 WILIjAMs, supra note 18, 264-65.
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III. SUICIDE AT THE COMMON LAW
The endeavor to unearth the attitude of the law toward suicide in
very early England has been compared to toying with a mist.121 English
law originated with community attempts to regulate conduct and to pro-
vide substitutes for the feuds that frequently developed between persons
or their families.122 Because suicide does not involve disputes between
individuals, it did not inspire the same sort of community concern.' 23
Eventually, the King and courts of royal justice provided an alternative
to local dispute resolution by administering an amalgamation of laws
common to the realm.124 Thus, the "common law emerged in the twelfth
century."' 25
As early as 673 A.D., however, suicide was condemned by the canon
law of the Catholic Church, and this law was adopted into England by
the Council of Hereford in that year.126 This prohibition was formalized
by King Edgar in 967 A.D. 127 Edgar's canon was "wholly ecclesiastical in
character,"128 and provided, "'[i]t is neither lawful to celebrate Mass for
the soul of one who by any diabolical instigation hath voluntarily com-
mitted murder on himself, nor to commit his body to the ground with
hymns and psalmody or any rites of honorable sepulture.'"'129 To this
penalty, popular custom added the further punishment of dishonoring
the corpse, which eventually became incorporated as part of the law.'
30




125 Id. (citing J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 4-5, 412 (2nd ed.
1979)). See also Rebecca C. Morgan et al., The Issue of Personal Choice: The Competent
Incurable Patient and the Right to Commit Suicide?, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1, 6 (1992). ("Black-
stone argued that it was a crime against the King because the King had a desire and a
stake in the lives of all his subjects.").
126 ST. JoHN-STEvAs, supra note 96, at 233; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 257 (stat-
ing that Canon law was adopted into England by 673 A.D.).
127 WnLLMs, supra note 18, at 257 (stating that King Edgar denied burial rights to per-
sons committing suicide).
128 See O'DEA, supra note 21, at 131; Maria T. Celo Cruz, Aid-in-Dying: Should We
Decriminalize Physician-Assisted Suicide and Physician-Committed Euthanasia?, 18 AM.
J.L. & MED. 369, 373 ("The origin of Suicide as an English common law offense was clearly
ecclesiastical.").
129 See O'DEA, supra note 21, at 311-12 (citing CHARLES MOORE, A FULL INQUIRY INTO THE
SUBJECT OF SUICIDE (London, 1790)).
130 ST. JoHN-STvAs, supra note 96, at 233. See also Kate E. Bloch, Note, The Role of Law
in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil Commitment-A Bystander Duty to Report Suicide
Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929, 931 (1987) (explaining that punishment for suicide consisted
of ignominious burial).
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This custom was a carryover from pagan practice1 3 ' and reflected the air
of superstition which hung over suicide.1 3 2 In 1601, it was noted that
the corpse of a felo de se was "drawn by a horse to the place of punish-
ment and shame, where he is hanged on a gibbet, and none may take the
body down but by the authority of a magistrate."1 3 3 Blackstone recorded
that burial was "in the highway, with a stake driven through the
body."13 4 Individuals committing suicide were often buried at crossroads
with stones placed over their faces.1 3 5 Such morbid interment was in-
tended to prevent them from rising again as a ghost or vampire. 13 6 Even
in modern times this primitive superstition survives in many ghost sto-
ries which assume that the ghost belongs to a person who has either
been murdered or committed suicide.'
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The first English legal treatise of consequence, known simply as
Glanvill, was published around 1187 and contains no mention of sui-
cide.1 3 ' However, Henry de Bracton's treatise, written between 1220
and 1260, largely incorporates the Roman law on suicide as presented in
the Digest of the Emperor Justinian.'3 9 Bracton charged that "[U]n the
same way, in which a person may commit a felony by killing another, so
he may commit a felony by killing himself, which felony indeed is said to
be committed against himself."' 40 If one is accused of a felony and is
"conscious of his crime and afraid of being hanged or of some other pun-
ishment, he has slain himself, and the inheritance shall be an escheat of
the lords. But if he has through phrensy or impatience of grief or by
misadventure, it shall be otherwise." 41 Bracton reiterated the Roman
view that suicide was not punished because of any intrinsic "wickedness"
of the deed: "[O]f those who... have slain themselves, let their goods be
confiscated, that is the goods of those who have brought upon themselves
the guilt of death, as if they were guilty of a crime for which they would
131 See WiLLAMS, supra note 18, at 258 (stating that pagan practice intruded into Chris-
tian philosophy).
132 Id. at 258-59.
133 Id. at 259.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 259.
136 See WiLLiAMs, supra note 18, at 259. See also ST. JoHN-STEvAs, supra note 96, at 233
(stating purpose was to prevent ghost from returning to earth).
137 WILLIAMs, supra note 18, at 259; see also Morgan et al., supra note 125, at 7 n.33 (ex-
plaining superstitious basis for burial of suicide).
138 Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 57.
139 WILLIAMs, supra note 18, at 261-62 (describing Bracton's treatment of suicide as "Ro-
manizing" the general rules).
140 2 HENRiCl DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONsuETDINiBus ANGLIAE 505 (Sir Travers
Twiss ed., Longman & Co. 1879).
141 2 id. at 351.
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be condemned to death or banishment."14 2 Elsewhere, however, Bracton
introduced the innovation that the personal property of a felo de se could
be forfeited even if his real property was not.14 Thus, one who killed
himself in order to escape felony conviction lost his entire estate, but "if
any one from weariness of life or impatience of pain has slain himself, he
may have a successor, and such a person does not lose his inheritance,
but let his movable goods only be confiscated.""' Finally, Bracton pro-
vided that no penalty would attach to the felo de se born out of insanity,
for such persons could not commit felony de se. 1
45
Three English legal treatises, Fleta, Britton, and Andrew Horn's
Mirror of Justices, were written between 1290 and 1292.146 These trea-
tises did little more on the subject of suicide than to restate Bracton in
slightly different terms. 1
47
The earliest statement of the rationale for the legal prohibition of
suicide was afforded by the Court of King's bench decision of Hales v.
Petit in 1561-1562.14' Accordingly, suicide
is an offence against nature, against God, and against the King.
Against nature, because it is contrary to the rules of self-preservation,
which is the principle of nature, for every thing living does by instinct
of nature defend itself from destruction, and then to destroy one's self
is contrary to nature, and a thing most horrible. Against God, in that
it is a breach of His commandment, thou shalt not kill; and to kill
himself, by which act he kills in presumption his own soul, is a greater
offence than to kill another. Against the King in that hereby he has
lost a subject, and.., he being the head has lost one of his mystical
members. Also he has offended the King, in giving such an example to
his subjects, and it belongs to the King, who has the government of the
people, to take care that no evil example be given them, and an evil
example is an offence against him.1
49
The rationale of a law articulated by a court is of paramount concern, if
the law is to have any binding force beyond blind adherence to precedent.
Thus, the court's holding that suicide is an offense against nature,
against God and against the King will now be reviewed.
The assertion that suicide violates a fundamental law of nature'
50
coincides with Aquinas' argument of the same design discussed ear-
142 2 id. at 507.
143 2 id.
144 2 id.
145 2 BRACTON, supra note 140, at 507-09.
146 Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 59-60.
147 See id. at 59 (stating Fleta restated Bracton in more cohesive terms).
148 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (1562).
149 Id. at 400.
150 Id.
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lier.151' While every living thing appears to instinctively defend itself
from destruction, this generalization hardly compels a rude prohibition
of suicide. Even if this observation is assimilated into the Thomistic be-
lief that self-preservation is the imprint of Divine Law upon the rational
creature," 2 it is nevertheless only one of the natural laws exemplified
through instinct. Other innate propensities which seemingly evince nat-
ural law canons include the tendency to preserve bodily integrity and the
desire to maintain human dignity. 5 3 Yet situations often arise in which
these various natural laws come into conflict; am I to preserve my being
to the cost of all else?' 5 4 Furthermore, whatever natural laws are im-
printed upon the rational creature are not spelled out in unambiguous
terms; a certain amount of reason and common sense is required in the
interpretation of any law.
The moralistic argument that suicide violates one of God's com-
mandments' 5 5 was first asserted by Augustine in The City of God.15 6
Thus, it is susceptible to the same objections that could be launched
against Augustine's stance discussed earlier.' 5 7 In neither the Old nor
the New Testament can one find support for this argument. 8 More-
151 See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
152 E.B.F. MmGLEY, THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION AND THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RE-
LATIONS 2-4, 159 (1975).
153 Id. at 1-42; Hadley Arkes, That 'Nature Herself Has Placed in Our Ears a Power of
Judging'. Some Reflections on the 'Naturalism' of Cicero, in NATURAL LAw THEORY 264
(Robert P. George ed., 1992) ("[Cleasing to be cannot be chosen as good.").
154 Arkes, supra note 153, 264-65; Lisa Sowle Cahill, A 'Natural Law' Reconsideration of
Euthanasia, in ON MORAL MEDICINE: THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 445,
450 (Stephen E. Lammers & Allen Verhey eds., 1987). Cahill, for example, has argued that
there is both a positive and a negative expression of the principle of the sanctity of life to be
found in Aquinas. Id. at 445. Whereas the negative expression is typically cast in terms of
prohibiting the direct killing of an innocent person, the positive "principle of totality" pro-
claims the proper subordination of a part to the good of the person as a whole. Id. Since
Catholic natural law teaching provides a strong basis for describing human personhood as
a totality comprised of both spiritual and physical aspects, see, e.g., Pope Pius XII, MYSTIC
CoRpoRms CHRISTI: ENCYCLICAL OF POPE PIUS XII ON THE MYSTICAL BODY OF CHRIST (June
29, 1943), reprinted in 4 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 225 (Claudia Carleen ed., McGrath Pub-
lishing 1981), it is clear that biological existence is never a preeminent good to be valued at
all costs. Thus, even voluntary euthanasia may constitute a legitimate moral option. Ca-
hill, supra at 450 (Deliberately-caused death is not so great an evil that it can never be
outweighed by greater goods."); see also McCartney, supra note 1, at 15 (Catholic tradition
recognizes right to refuse medical treatment).
155 Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (1562).
156 SArr AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 55-56 (Vernon J. Bourke ed. & Gerald G. Walsh et
al. trans., 1958). The commandment "Thou shalt not kill" is interpreted as prohibiting sui-
cide because it does not reference thy neighbor as do the commandments aimed solely at
others. Id.
157 See supra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.
158 Karen Lebacqz & H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., Suicide, in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANA-
sIA 669, 674 (Dennis J. Horan & David Mall eds., 1977). There is no "explicit condemnation
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over, a purely religious prohibition could not survive constitutional scru-
tiny. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 15 9 erected a
"wall of separation between church and state"160 which estops ecclesias-
tical concerns from intruding into secular institutions. 161
The argument that suicide deprives the King of one of his mystical
members' 6 2 is redolent of the Thomistic-Aristotelian assertion that sui-
cide treats the state unjustly. 16 3 While such feudal notions may have
had considerable impact during the Middle Ages and early Renaissance,
the entire American constitutional scheme rebels at the thought that the
interests of the individual are somehow subservient to the needs of the
community. A free society exists for the individual, not the converse.
16 4
The rationale advanced in Hales v. Petit for the prohibition of sui-
cide, that the King must not perpetrate an evil example to his sub-
jects, 16 5 is worthy of consideration. This admonition taken as a state-
ment concerning the educative or deterrent functions of the law, has
merit. The law should theoretically educate the public as to what types
of behavior will not be condoned. It should deter violations of that code
by imparting a certain fear of punishment to the perspective wrongdoer.
Suicide, however, is peculiar from all other crimes in one pertinent re-
spect: apart from whatever "punishment" can be inflicted upon a suicide
post mortem, the felo de se is beyond all legal sanction. 16 6 Thus, while
of suicide" in either book, therefore the argument is that it violates other prescriptions of
the Bible. Id.
159 U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... ).
160 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1878)), reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947).
161 See id. at 15-16 (government cannot participate in religious organizations).
162 Hales, 75 Eng. Rep. at 400 (1562).
163 Burgess-Jackson, supra note 8, at 71. People belong to a community and when they
take their own life they deprive the community of their existence. Id. The state has an
interest in preserving life because each person serves an economic purpose for the state. Id.
(citing Hales, 75 Eng. Rep. at 402).
164 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990). In Cruzan,
a serious auto accident rendered the petitioner incompetent with virtually no chance of
recovering her cognitive faculties. Id. at 265. Her parents sought a court order directing the
removal of the life support systems, keeping her alive. Id. Although the Court recognized a
competent adult's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in not being forced to undergo
unwanted medical procedures, id. at 278, the Court qualified this interest by stating that it
must be balanced against the state's right to preserve life. Id. at 279. The Court held that
since the petitioner was incapable of making an informed decision, Missouri can constitu-
tionally require a heightened procedural standard of clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
280.
165 Hales, 75 Eng. Rep. at 400.
166 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MoRAL Lirrs oF THE CaUINAL LAw-HAam To OTHERs 78-95
(1984). Feinberg argues that posthumous harm can occur when a surviving interest of the
deceased is violated after his death. Id. If the felo de se had a "surviving interest" in decent
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legal proscriptions of suicide may well inform the public that suicide is
generally met with reprobation, such edicts are not likely to serve as an
effective deterrent to the would-be suicide.
Scholars played a vital role in shaping the common law. Although
Sir Edward Coke, William Hawkins, and Sir Mathew Hale contributed
greatly to the development of the common law, 167 the most noteworthy
contribution came from Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England, published in 1765.168 It is an invaluable source of in-
formation on the common law and will forever be a part of English litera-
ture. 16 9 In condemning suicide, Blackstone advances a similar rational
to that espoused by the court in Hales v. Petit:
The law of England wisely and religiously considers that no man hath
a power to destroy life, but by commission from God, the author of it;
and, as the suicide is guilty of a double offence, one spiritual, in invad-
ing the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing into His immediate
presence uncalled for, the other temporal, against the king, who hath
an interest in the preservation of all his subjects, the law has therefore
ranked this among the highest crimes, making it a peculiar species of
felony, a felony committed on one's self.
1 70
burial, then one might argue that ignominious interment "punished" the suicide for his
final act. The common law practice of forfeiting the suicide's property to the crown punishes
only the survivors. The attendant practice of subjecting the suicide to ignominious burial
properly punishes the corpse. Id.
167 See Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 60-62. Sir Edward Coke's Third Institute of 1644
regarded suicide as a category of murder: "Felo de se is a man or woman, which being
compos mentia, of second memory, and of the age of discretion, killeth himself, which being
lawfully found by the oath of twelve men, all the goods and chattels of the party so offend-
ing are forfeited." Sm EDWARD CoKE, Tim THIRD PART OF THE INsTrrUTEs ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 54 (1680), reprinted in Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 60-61. Explicitly disagree-
ing with Bracton, however, Coke asserted that under no circumstances did a suicide forfeit
lands, but only goods and chattels. Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 61. William Hawkins' A
TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, published in 1716, mentioned that the laws of Eng-
land had consistently been opposed to suicide. Id. (citing 1 W. HAWKINS, A Treatise of the
Pleas of the Crown 164 (T. Leach ed., 7th ed. 1795)). In 1736, Sir Mathew Hale's Historia
Placitum Coronae mirrored and confirmed Coke, yet added a twofold rationale for the pro-
hibition of suicide:
No man hath the absolute interest of himself but, 1. God almighty hath an
interest and propriety in him, and therefore self-murder is a sin against God. 2.
The king hath an interest in him, and therefore the inquisition in case of self-
murder is felonice and voluntarie seipsum interfecit and murderarit contra
pacem domini regis [feloniously and voluntarily killed and murdered himself
against the peace of the lord king].
Sm MArrHEw HALE, 1 HISTOmiA PLACrrORUM CORONAE 411 (reprint. 1800) (1736), reprinted
in Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 62.
168 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (15th ed. 1809).
169 J.W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH's BLACKSTONE at preface (1959).
170 Id. at 837.
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While it is clear that "[t]he colonial American treatment of suicide
was rooted deep in the English past,"17' there was no general adoption of
English law regarding suicide in the American colonies. 172 Rather, the
colonies modified or even rejected the common law depending upon cir-
cumstances of their new environment. 173
It has been argued that there are "two avenues by which to infer the
attitude of the law toward the assistance of suicide during the period
when the ninth amendment... was submitted to the fourteen existing
states and ratified by eleven of them."' 74 The initial option "is to make
reference to the one source confidently known to have guided the Ameri-
can lawyers and judges during that era: Blackstone." 75 The alternative
approach "is to impute the later holdings of courts in the relevant states
(where there have not been intervening statutes) and in some cases the
judgments of treatises, to the period of which we speak."176 Under the
latter approach and based upon the available evidence, "six to eight of
the fourteen states are described as having prohibited assisting suicide
at the time of the adoption of the ninth amendment." 177
Few of the early reported decisions and treatises announce a ration-
ale for the criminalization of suicide. Those that do echo the types of
argument advanced by the early English decision of Hales v. Petit. 17
Moreover, a certain mien of religiosity can be discerned throughout
many of the decisions. Indeed, "[it] is impossible to overemphasize the
extent to which colonial law reflected religious doctrine. It has been said
the 'the primary objective of criminal law in the prerevolutionary period
was to give legal effect to the community's sense of sin and to punish
those who breached the community's taboos." 179
CONCLUSION
The controversy in legal and ethical theory regarding the desirabil-
ity of anti-suicide legislation is of recent vintage. Society's disapproval of
self-destruction found expression in early social, religious and legal
171 Burgess-Jackson, supra note 8, at 60.
172 Id.; ST. JoHN-STEvAs, supra note 96, at 241.
173 Burgess-Jackson, supra note 8, at 60-61.
174 Marzen et al., supra note 10, at 72.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 73. These states include Connecticut, New York, Maryland, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, and South Carolina. Id.
178 See notes 155-66 and accompanying text.
179 Burgess-Jackson, supra note 8, at 73 (citing W. Nelson, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COM-
MON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTs SociTY, 1760-1830, 37
(1975)).
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taboos. The inertia generated through the adherence to legal precedent
caused the proscription to become firmly imbedded in the law.
Due to recent medical and technological advances which make it
possible to extend human existence beyond the point where the compe-
tent individual might rationally conclude that life is no longer worth liv-
ing, the sagacity of such legislation must be brought under scrutiny. Re-
cent court decisions attest to situations in which even seriously ill,
competent adults have found standards to compel the removal of life sup-
port systems to be, at times, insurmountable due to the requirements
stipulated by state law.'8s If the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized suicide as a fundamental right, then legislation which in-
fringed upon that right would not be permitted unless it was necessary
to advance some compelling state interest.. and was narrowly drawn to
provide the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.' 8 2 A con-
stitutional right would ensure that the individual has control over the
circumstances of dying. States would still be permitted to promulgate
reasonable restrictions to regulate the exercise of this right and would
thereby fully continue present efforts to prevent the unwarranted self-
destruction of incompetents and minors; but no competent adult could be
forced to remain alive to their considered detriment.
An examination of the rationale behind the legal prohibition of sui-
cide through pertinent common law legacy reveals that the proscription
is almost exclusively the result of dubious theological precedent. Never-
theless, the prohibition of suicide has been carried through the centuries
on the wings of conservative prescription. Until recently there has been
no reason to reexamine the taboo. But legislation which sweeps too
broadly can run roughshod over the rights of individuals, and laws which
flatly forbid all forms of self-destruction can inure to the detriment of
seriously ill competent adults who find themselves forced to remain alive
against their will and best interests. As Justice Holmes observed,
[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.' 8 3
180 See supra notes 16-18.
181 Alan Sullivan, A Constitutional Right to Suicide, in SuIcIDE: THE PHILOsOPHCAL Is-
suEs 229, 232 (M. Pabst Battin & David J. Mayo eds., 1980) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 156 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)).
182 Id. at 232 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
183 Justice Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
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If there are grounds which will support an absolute prohibition of self-
willed death,' or which will prevent the establishment of the proposed
constitutional right to suicide, they will have to be found elsewhere.
There are no such grounds in the common law.
184 Lebacqz & Engelhardt, Jr., supra note 158, at 669-705; see generally David A.J. Rich-
ards, Constitutional Privacy, The Right to Die and the Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis,
22 WM. & MARY L. Rsv. 327, 372-403 (1981) (giving arguments which would prohibit acts
inflicting death). Suicide tends to maximize evil, therefore it is wrong. Lebacqz & Engel-
hardt, Jr., supra note 158, at 673-680. Deontological arguments, such as suicide is unnatu-
ral, irrevocable and self-contradictory, prove equally unavailing. Id.
